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to be alone in one's kind is another name for being an individual, and accordingly in any other sense of the term Mr. Rashdall's argument becomes untenable.

Yet Mr. Rashdall has a better and more "Hegelian" self, which appears at various points throughout the book, and more especially in the sermons on "Revelation by Character" and "The Christian Doctrine of Property," where the sharp individualism of other parts of the book is softened if not dissolved. Mr. Rashdall's style is clear and trenchant, but he occasionally allows himself a careless phrase, like "I will merely just commend" or "I only want just to point out."

Considering together the books of Mr. Illingworth and Mr. Rashdall, one cannot help noting the remarkable fact that the speculative influence of Lotze should have led one Oxford divine to defend the Christian religion on the basis of the unchangeableness of matter and another to support it on the ground of the finitude of God.

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LEIBNIZ: *The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings.*

Translated, with Introduction and Notes, by Robert Latta, M.A.,
D. Phil. Clarendon Press. Pp. xii., 437.

Leibniz has hardly met with the consideration in England that the importance and charm of his philosophy deserve, and in that respect alone, if in no other, Dr. Latta's work would be justified. It is perhaps misleading to write, as he does, of Langley's and Duncan's volumes as mere translations; the latter especially contains all of the pieces edited by Dr. Latta, besides numerous others, and a few, admittedly meagre, notes. The want of the English student, however, was rather a guide through the confusing and fragmentary mass of Leibniz's lesser but more important writings; and this is precisely the place which the present work, with its admirable Introduction will now fill. The same service Boutroux has already performed for the French reader in his edition of the *Monadology*, which probably suggested the form of the English work, to some extent. There are wide differences, however, as might be expected, of order and of emphasis in the two expositions.

The Introduction is divided into four parts: I. The Life and Works, II. General Principles of Philosophy, III. Detailed Statement (showing how the main principles are exemplified in the

theory of Infinitesimals, of matter, of organic life, and of man), IV. Historical and Critical Estimate of the Philosophy of Leibniz. To each of the separate writings also, of which translations are given, a note is prefaced, showing the circumstances under which Leibniz wrote it, and giving a short summary of its contents.

The work, as a whole, is scholarly in the highest sense, and is a gratifying proof that we in England are becoming alive to the value of exact and critical study of the sources and the historical influence of modern philosophical classics. Dr. Latta has evidently lived himself into the thought of Leibniz as few outside Germany have done, and the clearness and thoroughness of his reproduction of that thought leave little to be desired. The book would form an admirable text-book for a university or college course.

In the details of the Introduction one does not always feel satisfied with the writer's stand-point. There are occasional obscurities,—*e.g.*, in the treatment of self-consciousness (pp. 52 ff.). What is meant by the statement that “to Descartes the rational soul is the mind, and its reality comes only from its conscious certainty of itself?” Its reality? May self-consciousness, even in Descartes, be described as “the bare witness of consciousness to itself, its empty self-consistency”? One cannot help feeling that the meanings of “self-consciousness” as (1) mere awareness of the self as subject, and (2) knowledge of the self in its true nature, are hardly kept apart from one another. Each is justifiable in its own place, and the former is the light in which Descartes regarded the ego, the latter the point of view of Leibniz, so that it is hardly just to the former to condemn him for failing to achieve what he did not attempt. So it is not easy to understand how Descartes's standard of truth, “self-evidence or absence of contradiction in the ideas,” is “simply another way of describing the immediate witness of consciousness to itself” (pp. 58, 59). To Descartes it was the knowledge not of *what* the self is, but *that* it is, that was fundamental, and from the form of this truth he inferred what must be the form of *all* truth,—*viz.*, non-contradiction of the ideas involved,—a criterion which has not ceased to have value. Leibniz, on the other hand, taking for granted the existence of the self, was concerned to know *what* that self is, seeking its content in the eternal and necessary truths of reason which express the nature of God and therefore of the soul as a mirror of the divine.

In regard to the mechanical theories of the two writers, Descartes and Leibniz, there seems again too much emphasis laid on the value

of the latter's achievements (pp. 89 ff.). Neither the one nor the other had quite clear ideas on the nature of force; the measures of force proposed by them (mv and mv_2) are equally erroneous from the modern stand-point, while their respective Laws of Conservation,—Descartes's that the quantity of motion (in any given direction) is constant, Leibniz's that the quantity of moving force or kinetic energy is constant,—are equally true, on the same assumption, that of a system not acted upon by external forces. The statement, on page 107, that "the body of every substance—*i.e.*, its matter, its confused perception, its passivity—is the physical or mechanical cause of the substance," hardly rings true of Leibniz. The confused perception of one moment is, no doubt, the mechanical cause,—*i.e.*, the necessary antecedent of the clearer perception of the next, but hardly of the substance itself.

In the fourth part of the Introduction there is a very suggestive comparison between Kant's *a priori* conditions of the possibility of experience and Leibniz's "system of compossibles" as determining what exists; again, between Kant's thing in itself and Leibniz's choice of God among the possible worlds. Among the successors of Leibniz perhaps Herbart is awarded least justice;—"if we leave out of account the influence of Fichte upon his psychology, we may regard Herbart's work as a remodelling of that of Leibniz," and that not for the better. Surely we need no longer look at Herbart through Lotze's glasses. Is there not an assumption underlying Leibniz's philosophy,—of a real world, the world of ideas in the divine mind,—and is it not precisely this assumption which Herbart brings to light and transforms into the theory of a world of "reals," each independent in existence and entirely separate in quality from all others, which reveal themselves in the finite soul, but distorted through the imperfect medium, as Leibniz taught? And is not this, after all, the only possible interpretation of an ideal world? Neither unity nor continuity of life or of thought is possible without discrete elements, such as Leibniz's universal characteristic, for example, presupposes. Herbart's metaphysics represent the natural development of Leibniz's thought in an environment such as Kant and Fichte created.

These suggestions, however, are by no means intended to detract from the worth of a most careful and at the same time attractive study of Leibniz.

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